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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
LEEANN NAY, individually and as 
personal representative for 
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually 
and as personal representative 
for CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and 
JALYNN NAY, the heirs of 
WAYNE NAY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, GMC 
TRUCK DIVISION AND RON GREEN 
CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, INC., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (i) . The Utah Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-
2a-3(3)(h). 
This appeal is from a final judgement entered by the 
Third Judicial District Court for the County of Salt Lake, 
Honorable Judge Richard Moffat. 
Appeal No. 910244 & 910273 
(Argument Priority 16) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in granting respondent's 
Motion for a Directed Verdict in light of appellants1 weighty 
expert witness testimony? 
Standard of Review: The evidence must be examined in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis 
in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that 
would support a judgement in favor of the losing party, the 
directed verdict cannot be sustained. Management Comm. v. 
Grevstone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982); Anderson v. 
Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973); U.R.Civ.P. 50. 
2. Did the trial court err by granting respondentf s 
Motion in Limine, thereby excluding evidence of respondent's 1973 
recall of passenger cars designed substantially similar to the 
vehicle involved in the accident (NHTSA 73-0013)? 
Standard of Review: Erroneous exclusion of evidence is a ground for 
reversal if it appears that the evidence excluded would have had a 
substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict or 
finding. Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1983); Bradford v. 
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); Downey St. Bank v. Major-
Blakenev Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (1978); U.R.Evid. 103; U.R.Civ.P. 
61. 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
A party who moves for a directed verdict at 
the close of the evidence offered by an 
opponent may offer evidence in the event that 
the motion is not granted, without having 
reserved the right to do so and to the same 
extent as if the motion had not been made. A 
motion for a directed verdict which is not 
granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even 
though all parties to the action have moved 
for directed verdicts. A motion for a 
directed verdict shall state the specific 
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court 
granting a motion for a directed verdict is 
effective without any assent of the jury. 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the 
United States or the Constitution of the state 
of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this 
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
This is a products liability action concerning a 1986 GMC 
High Sierra truck which was involved in an accident on September 
20, 1986, killing Robert Nay and Wayne Nay. The appellants contend 
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that the accident was caused when a stone became lodged in a 
"pinch-point" between the flexible coupling and the end retainer 
nut on the steering box (i.e. inside the steering coupling)(See 
Exhibit "A"1) . The appellants also contend that the "pinch-point" 
constituted a defect which was unreasonably dangerous to users of 
the vehicle. 
2. Course of the Proceedings 
On September 19, 1988, the heirs of Wayne Nay and Robert 
Nay brought this action in the Third Judicial District Court for 
Salt Lake County. The appellants alleged that the manufacturer, 
General Motors, negligently designed the 198 6 GMC High Sierra 
vehicle. The appellants also alleged strict liability, breach of 
warranty, and res ipsa loquitur. 
1
 The steering coupling depicted in Exhibit A was offered and 
received in evidence and was examined by the jury at trial (Trial 
Exhibit P-l). The flexible coupling and the end retainer nut 
depicted in Exhibit A are exemplar, i.e., identical to or the same 
as those in the Nay vehicle. When the Nay Vehicle was initially 
inspected, the "stone interference" theory was not considered and 
thus the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut were not 
retained. However, the steering box depicted is the actual one 
taken from the Nay vehicle. The photographs in Exhibit A show 
different parts of the steering coupling from different angles. At 
trial, a stone was placed within the steering coupling, i.e. 
between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut, and each 
juror was allowed to feel the tension on the steering wheel created 
by the "stone interference". However, it should be noted that the 
stones depicted in the photographs are not the stones offered and 
received in evidence at trial and the photographs themselves were 
not offered or received into evidence at trial. They are shown 
here in Exhibit A solely for illustrative purposes and to avoid the 
necessity of making trial Exhibit P-l, which was offered and 
received in evidence at trial, available to each member of the 
court for individual inspection from different angles, as it was 
for the court and jury in the trial court. 
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On May 15, 1990, respondent General Motors made a Motion 
in Limine to exclude evidence of a 1973 recall (NHTSA 73-0013) of 
its passenger vehicles which were designed similar to the vehicle 
involved in the crash. The appellants countered, contending that 
the recall was probative evidence of General Motor's negligence, 
and that the appellants had illustrated sufficient similarities 
between the vehicles recalled and the vehicle involved in the 
accident to warrant admission of the recall statements. The 
District Court granted respondentf s Motion in Limine by minute 
entry dated September 28, 1990, and prohibited the appellants from 
introducing evidence of the recall at trial. 
The case proceeded to trial on October 1, 1990. During 
trial, the appellants introduced expert testimony from three 
witnesses, all of which indicated that a foreign object could 
become lodged in a "pinch-point" in the steering mechanism, which 
would prevent the driver from steering the vehicle. Each believed 
and testified that the accident was caused by General Motors 
negligently designing the steering mechanism which allowed a 
foreign object to become lodged in the "pinch-point" between the 
flexible coupling (moveable part) and the end retainer nut (non-
moveable part). 
The jury received the case with special interrogatories 
on October 11, 1990. After six hours of deliberation, the jury 
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requested further instructions from the Court. The jury was unable 
to muster the six votes needed to answer several of the special 
interrogatories. The trial court instructed the jury that if they 
could not agree, a verdict against the party having the burden of 
proof could be returned with fewer than six votes. (Judgement on 
Jury Verdict, pp. 1-2). The jury then returned a verdict for the 
respondent. (Id. at 2). 
The appellants polled the jury. On the special 
interrogatories where the jury found that the respondent did not 
negligently design the vehicle, the jury was evenly split. Four 
jurors disagreed with the verdict, and would hcive found General 
Motors negligent. Four jurors agreed with the verdict. (Judgement 
on Jury Verdict p. 2) . Nevertheless, the Court entered a judgement 
for respondent based on the juryfs verdict. (Id. at 5). 
The appellants moved for a new trial on November 2, 1990, 
contending that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to find 
for the respondent with less than the three-fourths majority 
required by Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution and Rule 
47 (q) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court 
agreed, and set aside the jury verdict as defective on May 23, 
1991. Appellants1 Motion for New Trial was granted through an 
Order issued April 15, 1991. However, after the trial court 
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granted appellants1 Motion for New Trial, the court granted 
respondent's Motion for Directed Verdict. 
In a minute entry dated May, 3, 1991, the court indicated 
that it had intended to grant respondent's Motion for Directed 
Verdict and deny appellants' Motion for New Trial. The Court 
issued an Amended Order on May 23, 1991 reflecting these changes. 
The appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on May 14, 1991, 
challenging the original April 15, 1991 Order granting both 
appellants' Motion for New Trial and respondent's Motion for 
Directed Verdict. The appellants also challenged the May 3, 1991 
minute entry denying their Motion for New Trial. 
A second Notice of Appeal was filed on May 31, 1991, 
challenging the May 23, 1991 Order, which was based on the May 3, 
1991 minute entry. Also challenged was the Court's minute entry of 
September 28, 1990, granting respondent's Motion in Limine which 
excluded evidence of respondent's prior recalls. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 3, 1986, Wayne Nay purchased a 1986 GMC High 
Sierra pickup truck with four wheel drive from Ron Green Chevrolet, 
Pontiac, GMC, Inc. Wayne Nay returned the vehicle for a 1000 mile 
checkup on August 25, 198 6. The High Sierra was checked for 
possible problems during this inspection and minor repairs were 
made. 
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On September 20, 1986, Wayne Nay was travelling with his 
nephew, Robert Nay, and Robert's son Matthew in the GMC High Sierra 
truck. When Nay tried to negotiate a slight curve on Convulsion 
Coal Mine Road in Salina Canyon, Utah, the steering locked. Unable 
to turn, the vehicle travelled in a straight path over the edge of 
a steep embankment. 
Wayne Nay died shortly after the accident, (T. Vol. I, p. 
85, 1. 3-5), but not before he told LeEarl Nay, who had arrived on 
the scene shortly after the accident, that he had tried to turn the 
steering wheel but it would not turn (T. Vol. I. p. 84, 1. 12-14). 
Robert Nay died shortly after the accident from his injuries. Only 
Matthew Nay survived; he witnessed Wayne Nay attempting 
unsuccessfully to turn the steering wheel (T. Vol. I. p. 61, 1. 14-
15) and applying the brakes (T. Vol. I. p. 60, 1. 21-22; p. 66, 1. 
10-14); he observed the vehicle go over the embankment and 
witnessed the deaths of his father and granduncle (T. Vol. I. p. 
61, 1. 23-24). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE APPELLANTS 
STATED CLAIMS OP NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY AGAINST RESPONDENT 
The appellants were required to establish not only that 
the vehicle contained an unreasonably dangerous defect at the time 
the vehicle left General Motors, but also that the defect caused 
the accident in order to recover against General Motors. 
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The appellants provided sufficient evidence of each of 
these elements to state a claim against General Motors, The 
appellants1 expert witnesses testified that the vehicle was 
defective because the flexible coupling was designed in close 
proximity to the end retainer nut. This design allowed a stone to 
become lodged inside the steering coupling, causing the steering to 
jam, and preventing Wayne Nay from turning the vehicle. The expert 
witnesses further testified that the defect was unreasonably 
dangerous and could have been eliminated at little cost to General 
Motors. 
The appellants also demonstrated that this defect caused 
the accident. Two of appellants1 expert witnesses, Lindley Manning 
and Dr. Ben Bayse, testified that the accident was caused by a 
stone lodged in the "pinch point" between the flexible coupling and 
retainer nut. These experts also testified that the wheels were 
pointed straight when the vehicle went over the cliff, indicating 
that Nay could not turn the vehicle. An accident 
reconstructionist, David Stephens, also determined that the wheels 
were pointed straight as the vehicle plunged into the ravine. 
All of the expert witnesses concluded that there was no 
driver error committed by Wayne Nay. Finally, the appellants 
established that there was a possibility that a stone could be 
flipped up by a tire into the coupling area. This evidence was 
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sufficient to state a claim against General Motors, and therefore 
the directed verdict must be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF A 1973 RECALL 
BY GENERAL MOTORS OP PASSENGER CARS DESIGNED SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR 
TO THE NAY VEHICLE. 
In 1973, General Motors recalled 3.7 million "B" cars 
because there was a possibility that a stone would become lodged 
between the flexible coupling (moving part)and the frame (non-
moving part). Here, the appellants have alleged that a stone 
became lodged between the flexible coupling (moving part) and the 
end retainer nut (non-moving part). 
The Fifth Circuit, in a nearly identical case, has 
already ruled that the notices issued by General Motors in 
connection with the 1973 recall should be admitted to establish the 
possibility that a stone could become lodged inside the steering 
coupling. Lowe v. General Motors Corp. , 624 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 
1973) (See Exhibit "D") . The Court in Lowe found that the danger 
necessitating the recall (stone becoming lodged between the 
steering coupling and the engine wall) was substantially similar to 
the danger of a stone becoming lodged inside the steering coupling 
(between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut), and 
therefore the recall notices should have been admitted. This Court 
should follow Lowe and hold that the notices are relevant to 
establish the defective nature of the vehicle. 
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These recall notices are relevant evidence to establish 
that the design of the vehicle was defective- The notices are also 
relevant not only to bolster the credibility of the expert 
witnesses but also to bolster the appellants1 explanation of the 
accident. Finally, the recall notices are relevant evidence that 
General Motors was aware that designing the flexible coupling in 
close proximity to a non-moving part constituted an unreasonably 
dangerous defect. This awareness supports the appellants1 claim 
for punitive damages. 
The appellants have established that the Nay vehicle was 
designed substantially similar to the vehicles involved in the 
recall. Dr. Ben Bayse has testified that the steering system used 
in the Nay vehicle was essentially and substantially equivalent to 
the steering system in the vehicles that were recalled in 1973. 
General Motors own stone interference expert, Jerry Confer, has 
testified that the design of the B cars was identical to the design 
of the Nay vehicle. 
These notices should have been admitted to establish that 
the vehicle's design constituted an unreasonably dangerous defect, 
to establish the credibility of the expert witnesses presented by 
both sides, and to establish awareness on the part of General 
Motors, which is relevant for a claim of punitive damages. 
11 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE APPELLANTS PROVIDED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO STATE A CLAIM OF 
NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY AGAINST GENERAL MOTORS. THEREFORE, 
THE DIRECTED VERDICT GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE 
OVERTURNED. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a directed verdict, this Court applies the 
same standard as that applied by the District Court, Management 
Comm. v. Greystone Pines, Inc. , 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). The 
evidence in the record must be such that reasonable men could not 
arrive at different conclusions. Id.; Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah 
2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973); Rhiness v. Dansie, 24 Utah 2d 375, 472 
P.2d 428 (1970). Furthermore, all evidence must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the appellants. Finlayson v. Brady, 121 
Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491 (1952); Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 
Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953). Thus, if there is any evidence in 
the record which could support a verdict for the losing party, the 
directed verdict must be reversed. Management Comm. v. Greystone 
Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). 
B. THE APPELLANTS PROVIDED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO STATE A CLAIM FOR 
RELIEF 
The District Court instructed the jury that in order for 
appellants to prevail, three elements had to be established: 1) 
that a defect existed in the vehicle involved in the accident; 2) 
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that the defect existed at the time the vehicle left the 
manufacturer; and 3) that the defect was the proximate cause of the 
accident. (Jury Instruction #24}. See Ernst W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco 
Steel Co. , 601 p.2d 152 (Utah 1979); Dowland v. Lyman Products for 
Shooters, 642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982); Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§402A. 
The District Court further instructed the jury, over 
appellants1 objection, that the vehicle must be "unreasonably 
dangerous" as a result of the defect (Jury Instruction 23) . 
Dowland, 642 P. 2d at 381. Unreasonably dangerous was defined by the 
trial court as a danger beyond that which would be contemplated by 
the ordinary and prudent buyer of the vehicle (Jury Instruction 
#22). The appellants presented substantial evidence to prove each 
of the above elements of their strict liability claim. 
1. The Vehicle Contained a Design Defect 
The appellants provided extensive evidence of an 
unreasonably dangerous defect in the vehicle. The defective 
condition was the location of the flexible coupling in close 
proximity to the end retainer nut on the steering box, creating a 
"pinch-point". (See Exhibit "A"; See also Trial Exhibits 68-69, 64-
65, and 38-42, showing the flexible coupling in close proximity to 
the end retainer nut, creating the "pinch point". The nut and the 
coupling together constitute the steering coupling). This defect 
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allowed a stone to become lodged inside the steering coupling, 
causing the steering mechanism to jam, resulting in a total loss of 
steering. 
Each of the appellants1 expert witnesses testified as to 
the defective nature of the vehicle. Lindley Manning testified 
that the close clearing between the end retainer nut and the 
coupling was a defect resulting in an unreasonably dangerous 
condition. (T. Vol. I, p. 21 1. 12-15). Mr. Manning successfully 
placed stones between the coupling and the end retainer nut which 
resulted in a total loss of steering (T. Vol. I, p. 22-24). Manning 
demonstrated this to the jury during the trial (T. Vol. I, p. 23, 
1. 1-10). 
Dr. Ben Bayse likewise testified that the design of the 
vehicle, which allowed a foreign object to become lodged in the 
"pinch point", was defective (T. Vol. I, p. 184, 1. 15-24). 
Lindley Manning testified that the product would still be 
unreasonably dangerous even if the probability was slight that a 
stone could become lodged inside the steering coupling (T. Vol. I, 
p. 40, 1. 8-15) . Dr. Bayse was also able to recreate the defective 
condition by placing a stone inside the steering coupling, which 
resulted in a total loss of steering. (T. Vol. I, p. 189-90). 
Lindley Manning testified that the possibility of a stone becoming 
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inside the steering coupling was foreseeable and should have been 
corrected by General Motors (T. Vol. I, p. 40, 1. 16-22). 
David Stephens, an accident reconstructionist, testified 
that the stone interference theory was reasonable, (T. Vol. I, p. 
141, 1. 17-20), and was also able to lodge a stone in the "pinch 
pointff between the coupling and the retainer nut, which resulted in 
a total loss of steering (T. Vol. I, p. 261, 1. 1-2). 
Both Dr. Bayse and Lindley Manning testified that General 
Motors could have eliminated this defect at little cost. Both 
testified that the defect could have been eliminated by designing 
the flexible coupling further from the end retainer nut (T. Vol I, 
pp. 180, 1. 17-23; p. 225, 1. 14-25; p. 28, 1. 8-21). Dr. Bayse 
testified that designing the vehicle without the "pinch point" 
could have been accomplished with ease and at little expense (T. 
Vol. I, p. 190, 1. 20-25, p. 220, 1. 19-24). 
Dr. Bayse provided a photograph of a 1984 Dodge vehicle, 
(Trial Exhibits 74-76), which illustrated that Dodge was able to 
design out this defect by locating the flexible coupling a 
substantial distance from the end retainer nut, thus eliminating 
the pinch-point. 
Lindley Manning testified that the defect could have been 
eliminated by "reversing the ears" (T. Vol. I, p. 29, 1. 3-13). 
The ears are metals tips that protrude from the nut. By pointing 
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these ears toward the steering box rather than toward the flexible 
coupling, the potential of stones becoming lodged in the pinch 
point would be greatly diminished (Id.). 
Both expert witnesses testified that the defect could be 
eliminated by installing a guard over the steering coupling (T. 
Vol. I, p. 179, 1. 1-5; p. 29, 1. 30). This guard would protect 
against any stones becoming lodged inside the steering coupling. 
Dr. Manning testified that the cost of such a guard would be less 
than one dollar. (T. Vol. I, p. 30, 1. 15-19). 
Both also testified that the purpose of the flexible 
coupling is to reduce the noise in the passenger compartment and 
that there is no reason why the flexible coupling (moveable part) 
has to be in such close proximity to the end retainer nut (non-
moveable part) in order to reduce this noise. Rather, the flexible 
coupling could accomplish the reduction in noise in the passenger 
compartment at any distance from the end retainer nut. 
2. This Defect was the Cause of the Accident. 
The trial court instructed the jury that the appellants 
had the burden of proving that the defect in the vehicle caused the 
accident. The appellants provided extensive evidence to establish 
that the accident was caused by a stone becoming lodged inside 
steering coupling at the very point the expert witnesses described 
as defective. 
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Lindley Manning testified that the most probable cause of 
the accident was the inability of the driver, Wayne Nay, to turn 
the vehicle due to a stone lodged inside the steering coupling, 
i.e. between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut (T. 
Vol. I, p. 12, 1. 9-20). Dr. Bayse also found that the accident 
was caused by a foreign object lodged in the "pinch point" which 
prevented Wayne Nay from turning the vehicle. (T. Vol. I, p. 218, 
1. 22-25). He could find no other reasonable explanation for the 
accident. (T. Vol. I, p. 232, 1. 1-3). David Stephens also believed 
that stone interference was a reasonable explanation for the 
accident (T. Vol. I, p. 141, 1. 17-20). 
The appellants1 expert witnesses also conducted 
experiments which indicated that Wayne Nay could not turn the 
vehicle. David Stephens, an accident reconstructionist, measured 
the track left by the tires when they were pointed straight ahead 
at 7 1/2 inches wide (T. Vol. I, p. 135, 1. 5-9). When the 
vehiclefs tires were turned to the left, but the vehicle was 
travelling straight, the tires left a track of 12 inches (T. Vol. 
I, p. 135, 1. 10-12). When Mr. Stephens measured the tire tracks 
left by the Nay vehicle at the accident scene, he found the them to 
be 7 1/2 inches wide (T. Vol. I, p. 135, 1. 13-17). Mr. Stephens 
therefore concluded that the Nay vehicle's tires were pointed 
straight ahead when the vehicle plunged into the ravine. 
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Lindley Manning reached the same conclusion. When he 
visited the accident scene, he determined that the tires were 
pointed straight ahead (T. Vol. I, p. 16, 1. 15-18). He could find 
no evidence of a plowing effect, which would be expected if the 
wheels were turned but the vehicle was travelling straight (T. Vol. 
I, p. 16, 1. 1-13). The investigating officer's diagrams also 
indicate that the Nay vehicle travelled in a straight path over the 
cliff. (See Trial Exhibits 21-22, attached as Exhibit "B"). 
Also, the only eye witness to the accident, Matthew Nay, 
testified that he saw Wayne Nay trying in vain to turn the vehicle 
and also applying the brakes (T. Vol. I, p. 61, 1. 11-13; p. 66, 1. 
10-15; p. 16, 1. 22-24). The driver the vehicle, Wayne Nay, told 
LeEarl Nay before he died at the scene that the "goddamn truck 
didn't turn" (T. Vol. I, p. 84, 1. 13-14). 
Thus, the appellants established for the jury that Wayne 
Nay tried to steer the vehicle but that the vehicle could not be 
turned. The tire tracks leading over the edge of the cliff were 
pointing straight ahead. Both of the appellants1 expert witnesses 
testified that the reason the vehicle could not be turned was that 
there was a stone lodged inside the steering coupling between the 
flexible steering coupling and the end retainer nut (T. Vol. I, p. 
12, 1. 9-20; p. 218, 1. 22-25). 
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In defending this action, General Motors has contended 
that driving error committed by Wayne Nay was the sole cause of the 
accident. However, each of the appellants1 expert witnesses 
testified that driver error did not contribute to the accident. 
David Stephens investigated driver error but could find no evidence 
of error (T. Vol. I, p. 117, 1. 21-24). Lindley Manning found that 
Wayne Nay was not travelling at excessive speed, (T. Vol. I, p. 13, 
1. 11-17) , and that the brakes did not lock when Wayne Nay applied 
them. (T. Vol. I, p. 13, 1. 13-14). Manning reached this conclusion 
by measuring the width of the tracks left by the Nay vehicle, which 
indicated that the wheels were pointed straight (T. Vol I, p. 14, 
1. 1-6) (See also Exhibit "B") . If the brakes were locked, Wayne Nay 
would have been able to steer the vehicle, but the vehicle would 
have skidded rather than turned (Id.)* Because the wheels were 
straight, he determined that Wayne Nay tried to turn the vehicle 
but it would not turn (T. Vol. I, p. 13, 1. 11-17). Dr. Bayse 
likewise concluded there was no driver error (T. Vol. I, p. 219, 1. 
20-23) . 
Finally, the appellants established that a stone could be 
flipped by a tire into the steering coupling resulting in a total 
loss of steering. Lindley Manning testified that it is possible 
for a stone to be kicked up into the steering coupling area (T. 
Vol. I, p. 51, 1. 12-14). David Stephens testified that stone 
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chips are very common, (T. Vol. I, p. 150, 1. 21-25), and that the 
tires of the High Sierra could have thrown stones up to an inch in 
diameter into the steering coupling (T. Vol. I, p. 151, 1. 10-11). 
Dr. Bayse concurred that stones could be thrown by the tires into 
the steering coupling (T. Vol. I, p. 197, 1. 1-25). 
Lindley Manning also testified that the possibility of a 
stone being kicked up into the coupling area would not be 
eliminated if the road was paved (T Vol. I, p. 37, 1. 19-25). 
Nevertheless, David Stephens testified that the road had been seal-
coated during the six weeks preceding the accident (T. Vol. I, p. 
106, 1. 5-22) . When the road was seal coated, stones and chips 
were spread on the road to create the seal (Id.). Stephens found 
a thick layer of these stones and chips by the side of the road 
where the accident occurred (Id.). 
The appellants also introduced into evidence a report 
prepared by the Value Engineering Laboratory entitled "Valuation of 
the Steering of Obstruction Problems Conducted for the Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety." (Trial Exhibit 6). This report 
concluded that "it was demonstrated that under some driving 
conditions on gravel surfaces, gravel is kicked up into the area of 
the steering coupling." The report also contains photographs 
depicting stones that have become lodged inside the steering 
coupling. (T. Exhibit 6, pp. 60-63). 
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From this evidence, the jury could have concluded that it 
was probable that a stone could be flipped up into the steering 
coupling and possibly lodge between the flexible coupling and the 
end retainer nut, thereby causing the accident. 
3 . Defect existed when the vehicle left the manufacturer 
The appellants have also established that the vehicle was 
designed with the flexible coupling located near the end retainer 
nut, creating the pinch-point. Since this was a design defect 
rather than a manufacturing defect, the defect existed at the time 
the vehicle left the manufacturer. This conclusion is buttressed 
by the fact that the vehicle was purchased only three months prior 
to the accident. A strong inference is created that the vehicle 
contained the defect when it left the manufacturer when the vehicle 
suffers the failure soon after purchase. Annotation, "Products 
Liability: Admissability, Against Manufacturer, of Products Recall 
Letter", 84 A.L.R.3d 1220 (1978). 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants have provided extensive evidence to 
establish that the design of the 1986 GMC High Sierra was 
defective. Expert witnesses presented evidence establishing the 
defective nature of designing the vehicle with a "pinch point" 
between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut. These 
expert witnesses also testified that it was possible and 
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foreseeable that a stone could become lodged inside this steering 
coupling. 
The appellants have also demonstrated that this defect 
was the cause of the accident. The appellants1 expert witnesses 
have testified that Wayne Nay was in no respect the cause of the 
accident, but rather that the accident was caused by a stone 
becoming lodged inside the steering coupling, between the flexible 
coupling and the end retainer nut. Finally, the appellants have 
presented evidence that there was a probability that a rock could 
have been flipped into the steering coupling, causing a total loss 
of steering. 
Thus, appellants have provided extensive evidence to 
support each element of their claim against General Motors. The 
directed verdict granted by the District Court was based on Judge 
Moffat's belief that the appellants did not provide sufficient 
evidence to state a claim against General Motors (T. Vol. I, p. 
269, 1. 4-7; p. 270, 1. 15-20). As stated at the outset, this 
directed verdict can only stand if this Court determines that 
reasonable minds could not differ as to evidence presented. The 
issue before the Court is whether the evidence outlined immediately 
above can in any manner state a claim against General Motors. On 
the basis of the foregoing, a reasonable juror could have found for 
the appellants and against the respondent. In fact, four jurors 
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concluded that General Motors was negligent and that there was an 
unreasonably dangerous design defect which caused the accident. 
Therefore, the directed verdict must be reversed and the cause 
tried anew, 
C. FOUR REASONABLE JURORS DID FIND THAT APPELLANTS STATED A CAUSE 
OF ACTION AGAINST RESPONDENT GENERAL MOTORS 
In granting the directed verdict, Judge Moffat believed 
that the appellants "didn't prove your case" and that stone 
interference was not "a valid claim" (T. Vol. I, p. 269, 1. 7; p. 
270, 1. 15-19) . This ignores the four members of the jury that did 
believe that the appellants had proved their case and that the 
stone interference claim was a valid claim. 
The appellants have outlined the evidence presented to 
the jury in order to establish that a juror could find that 
respondent was negligent and that the vehicle was defective. 
However, this Court has the benefit of direct evidence that 
reasonable minds could, and did, disagree as to the evidence 
presented by the appellants. When the appellants polled the jury 
after the jury returned the verdict for respondent, four of the 
jurors stated that they disagreed with the verdict and would have 
returned a verdict against General Motors. These jurors would have 
found that the close clearing between the flexible coupling and the 
end retainer nut was a defect that was unreasonably dangerous. 
These jurors believed that a stone lodged inside the steering 
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coupling was the cause of the accident. These jurors also believed 
that General Motors negligently designed the vehicle. The fact 
that four out of eight jurors found the appellants1 evidence 
sufficient to state an action against General Motors is ample 
evidence that reasonable minds could differ. 
Also, Judge Moffat apparently believed that the evidence 
presented by appellants was sufficient to state an action against 
General Motors. At the close of appellants1 case in chief, 
respondent moved for a directed verdict. This motion was denied. 
Respondent also requested a jury instruction which instructed the 
jury to return a verdict for the respondent. This was also denied. 
Thus, the trial court had ample opportunity to grant a directed 
verdict if the appellants failed to state a claim. Only after the 
trial court improperly instructed the jury and accepted a verdict 
without the support of six jurors was the directed verdict granted. 
The fact that the trial court did not grant the directed verdict 
earlier is probative evidence that the appellants stated a claim 
for relief. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE APPELLANTS TO INTRODUCE 
EVIDENCE THAT IN 1973, GENERAL MOTORS RECALLED VEHICLES WITH 
DESIGNS SIMILAR TO THE SUBJECT VEHICLE DUE TO STONE INTERFERENCE. 
In October, 1973, General Motors issued recall notices on 
3.7 million "B-cars" manufactured by its Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick 
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and Oldsmobile Motor divisions (NHTSA 73-0013) (See Exhibit "C"2) . 
The recall was required due to a defect whereby the front 
crossmember would scoop stones into the engine compartment. There 
was a potential that one of these stones could become lodged 
between the flexible coupling (moveable part) and the frame (non-
moving part), resulting in a partial loss of steering. 
In order to correct this defect, General Motors placed a 
steering coupling shield over both the flexible coupling and the 
steering box, of which the end retainer nut is part. (See Exhibit 
"C", letter to owners, paragraphs 2,5). The purpose of this shield 
was to prevent stones from becoming lodged between the steering 
coupling and the frame. Because the shield covered both the 
flexible coupling and the end retainer nut, the shield also reduced 
the possibility of a stone becoming lodged inside the coupling 
itself, i.e. between the flexible coupling and the end retainer 
nut. 
Although General Motors chose to correct this defect in 
its passenger cars, where there was a potential for partial 
steering loss because of the "pinch point" between the steering 
2
 Exhibit B contains a copy of the recall notice issued by 
General Motors and also the letter sent to the NHTSA explaining the 
defect. These were introduced at the Deposition of Gerald Confer. 
(Ex. 1-3) . The final page is a summary of the recall campaign 
compiled by Automobile Design Liability 2d, § 4:1.124, at 412 
(1978). 
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coupling and the frame, General Motors chose not to correct the 
defect in the pickup truck, such as the Nay vehicle, where there 
was a potential for complete steering loss because of the "pinch 
point" within the steering coupling itself, i.e. between the 
flexible coupling and the end retainer nut- Such a failure by 
General Motors is especially egregious in light of the fact that 
pickup trucks are frequently driven on gravel roads and off-road 
terrain, much more so than passenger cars, where the potential for 
rocks or stones being flipped up or propelled into the area of the 
steering coupling is far greater than on paved roads. 
In the instant action, the appellants have alleged that 
a stone was scooped into the engine compartment. The stone then 
became lodged inside the steering coupling, i.e. between the 
flexible coupling (moving part) and the end retainer nut (non-
moving part). This stone interference caused the steering to jam, 
preventing Wayne Nay from turning the vehicle, and causing the 
deadly crash. The appellants assert that the recall notices issued 
by General Motors in 1973 are relevant evidence in this matter. 
Rule 402 provides that all relevant evidence" is 
admissible unless otherwise proscribed by law. U.R.Evid. 402. Rule 
401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
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would be without the evidence." U.R.Evid. 401. The issue before 
this court is whether the recall notices issued by General Motors 
constitute relevant evidence which should have been admissible at 
trial. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Erroneous exclusion of evidence is a ground for reversal 
if it appears that the evidence excluded would have had a 
substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict or 
finding. Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1983); Bradford v. 
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); Downey St. Bank v. Major 
Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978). Here, the exclusion of 
the recall notices was error and that admission of the recall 
notices would have had a substantial effect in bringing about a 
different result. Reversal is therefore warranted. 
B. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT HAS ALREADY RULED THAT THE RECALL NOTICES 
ISSUED BY GENERAL MOTORS IN 1973 ARE ADMISSIBLE TO ESTABLISH THAT 
A STONE COULD BECOME LODGED INSIDE THE STEERING COUPLING. 
The recall notices issued by General Motors in 1973 
(NHTSA 73-0013) should have been admissible at trial. The Fifth 
Circuit, in an almost identical case, has already ruled that the 
recall notices issued by General Motors during their 1973 recall 
campaign (NHTSA 73-0013) should be admissible to show that a stone 
could become lodged inside the steering coupling, i.e. between the 
flexible coupling and the end retainer nut, resulting in a total 
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loss of steering. Lowe v. General Motors Corp.
 r 624 F.2d 1373 (5th 
Cir. 1973) (a copy of is attached as Exhibit "D"). 
The facts in Lowe are nearly identical to those in the 
present case3. On September 17, 1973, Elva Fulford drove her 1971 
Chevrolet Impala to pick up her daughter Lou Ann Lowe. She 
travelled along a gravel road to her daughter's home, then returned 
on a paved road. Suddenly, the vehicle inexplicably veered to the 
left, and overturned down an embankment. At the accident scene, 
3
 The appellants were unaware of this case before the trial 
court because they were unaware of the claim. Obviously, General 
Motors was aware of this claim and this case, but failed to so 
advise appellants or the trial court. General Motors responded to 
appellants1 First Set of Interrogatories, Number 6, which asked: 
"Have any allegations been made by any person. . . that a . . . 
power steering system including coupling, has locked up or jammed, 
while in use so that the vehicle could not be properly steered?" 
General Motors objected and then offered this: "Partial Answer: 
Notwithstanding this objection, Willie Mae Busse v. GMC . . . 
involved an allegation that a stone interfered with the flexible 
coupling in a Chevrolet 1/2 ton pickup truck." The Court precluded 
appellants from having their expert witness, Dr. Ben Bayse, testify 
as to the details of that case, even though he was plaintiff's 
expert witness in that case. In addition, General Motors responded 
to appellants' First Request for Production of Documents, Number 3, 
which asked: "Please produce . . . all documents . . . relating in 
any way to complaints which have been made concerning the potential 
for foreign objects to engage in the coupling and jam up the 
steering system. . .?" General Motors objected and then gave this 
"Response: General Motors has had one lawsuit involving an 
allegation that a stone or other foreign object lodged between the 
flexible coupling and the steering gear assembly in a 1/2 ton 
pickup, inhibiting steering: Willie Mae Busse v. GMC, St. Louis 
Circuit Court, Case No. 822-02064." (emphasis added). Arguably, 
General Motors qualified its response, in "a 1/2 ton pickup" so as 
to avoid having to disclose its knowledge of Lowe v. General 
Motors, supra, and the impact which said case would have had in the 
subject case. 
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Mrs. Fulford told a witness, J. C. Champion, that the car had 
suddenly become impossible to steer. A State Trooper that inspected 
the vehicle found a stone lodged inside the steering coupling. The 
Chevrolet Impala was one of the vehicles recalled due to the 
potential of stone interference between the steering coupling and 
the frame (NHTSA 73-0013). 
During the first trial, plaintiffs1 experts testified 
that the accident was caused when a stone became lodged inside the 
steering coupling, i.e. between the flexible coupling and the end 
retainer nut. The plaintiffs expert witnesses testified that the 
design of the steering coupling was defective because it allowed 
stones to fly up into the coupling area. Id. at 1376. The 
plaintiffs were also allowed to introduce testimony regarding the 
1973 recall of the Impala. The jury returned a verdict for the 
plaintiffs, and awarded $500,000 to the heirs of the deceased 
driver and $500,000 to the heirs of the deceased passenger. 
However, the judge ordered a second trial and prohibited 
the plaintiffs from introducing testimony regarding the 197 3 recall 
during that trial. After the second trial, the court granted 
General Motorsf motion for directed verdict as to the failure to 
warn claim, and the jury returned a verdict for General Motors as 
to the other claims. 
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The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the recall 
notices were relevant to establish not only the possibility that a 
stone could become lodged inside the steering coupling, but also to 
establish that General Motors failed to warn plaintiffs of the 
hazardous design. More specifically, the Court stated: 
The risk of partial loss of steering due to a 
stone lodged between the coupling and the 
frame and the risk of total loss of steering 
due to a stone lodged within the steering 
coupling are quite similar dangers. It is not 
unreasonable to infer that if GM knew of one 
risk, they might have known of the other. 
Id. at 1382 (emphasis added). This conclusion was reached even 
though General Motors argued that they had never known a stone to 
become lodged inside the steering coupling, and that they had not 
been able to lodge a stone inside the coupling during their 
testing. 
In the subject case, the appellants were prohibited by 
the trial court from introducing evidence of the 1973 General 
Motors recall because, in the trial court's opinion, the "pinch 
point" between the flexible coupling and the frame (the defect 
involved in the recall) was not the same as the "pinch point" 
within the coupling itself, i.e. between the flexible coupling and 
the end retainer nut. The Fifth Circuit held that both "pinch 
points" "are quite similar dangers." Lowe, 624 F.2d 1382. Both 
"pinch points" create the opportunity for a stone to become lodged 
30 
in the "pinch point11. If a stone does become lodged, it can affect 
the steering, to wit, a partial loss of steering if the stone 
becomes lodged between the coupling and the frame but a total loss 
of steering if the stone lodges within the steering coupling 
itself. 
Lowe demonstrates not only that the trial court here 
erred by excluding the recall notices, but also that the recall 
notices would likely have brought about a different result. In 
Lowe, the plaintiffs argued that a stone became lodged inside the 
steering coupling. Appellants in this action have also alleged 
that a stone became lodged inside the steering coupling. In Lowe, 
General Motors argued that they had never known of a stone becoming 
lodged in the steering coupling. General Motors advances this 
argument here as well. 
In Lowe, the plaintiffs sought to introduce the recall 
notices issued by General Motors in 1973 to establish that the 
design of the vehicle was defective and that General Motors was 
aware of the potential for stone interference inside the steering 
coupling. Appellants here seek introduction of the recall notices 
in order to establish these same allegations. The Fifth Circuit 
found that the notices were relevant for these purposes because the 
potential of interference between the steering coupling and frame 
is quite similar to the potential for interference due to a stone 
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lodged inside the steering coupling, i.e between the flexible 
coupling and the end retainer nut. Appellants in this case argued 
before the trial court that the recall notices are relevant to 
establish the same defect. The relevant facts of Lowe are nearly 
identical to those alleged by the appellants in this action. Like 
Lowe, the recall notices should be admissible at trial. 
Lowe also demonstrates that the introduction of the 
recall notices would have a substantial impact on bringing about a 
different result. There, the plaintiffs prevailed during their 
first trial, in which the recall notices were admitted. Deprived 
of these notices during the second trial, the plaintiffs failed to 
persuade the judge and the jury as to their claims that General 
Motors failed to warn them of the defective condition and that the 
vehicle was defectively designed. 
In the subject case, the appellants were prohibited by 
the trial court from introducing evidence of the 1973 General 
Motors recall. Appellants were denied relief. Like Lowe, the 
introduction of the recall statements in the subject case would 
have a substantial impact in bringing about a verdict for the 
Appellants. We respectfully ask this Court to follow Lowe and 
allow evidence of the 1973 General Motors recall to be admitted at 
trial in the subject case. 
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C. THE DESIGN OF THE VEHICLE INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT WAS 
SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE DESIGN OF THE VEHICLES RECALLED IN 
1973. 
In oiTder to establish thai: tiie recall notices were 
relevant, the appellants demonstrated that the design of the Nay 
vehicle was substantially similar to the design of the vehicles 
involved in the 1973 General Motors recall. See Hesson v. Jaguar 
Cars, 915 F.2d 641 (11th Cir. 1990); Calhoun v. Honda Motor Co., 
738 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1984); Kane v. Ford Motor Co. , 450 F.2d 315 
(3rd Cir. 1971). 
The trial court excluded the recall notices because the 
court believed that the design of the vehicle involved in the 
accident and tfte design of the vehicles recalled in 1973 were 
"entirely different and dissimilar" (Minute Entry, September 28, 
1990) . The appellants contend that the vehicles involved in the 
recall were designed substantially similar to the High Sierra 
involved in the accident. 
Dr. Ben Bayse has testified that the "Saginaw steering 
system used in the 1986 GMC High Sierra pickup truck driven by 
Wayne Nay • * * w^s mechanically and functionally essentially 
equivalent to the steering system used in the 3,707,064 General 
Motors automobiles which were recalled in 1973 (NHTSA Recall 
Campaign 73-0013)." (Aff. of Dr. Ben Bayse, 5. 4). Furthermore, Dr. 
Bayse has concluded that the steering parts were functionally 
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equivalent, resulting in a pinch point between the moving flexible 
coupling and a non-moving part, (Aff. of Dr. Ben Bayse, 5. 5). 
General Motors1 own expert on stone interference also 
testified that fl[i]f you want to relate now to the steering gear or 
the coupling, there1 s no difference between the B car and the 
truck, theyf re the same." (Deposition of Gerald Confer, p. 
68B)(emphasis added)(attached as Exhibit "E"). 
As explained above in discussing the Lowe case, there is 
also a relevant similarity between the defect involved in the 
recall and the defect claimed in this action. Through this 
evidence, appellants established that the recalled vehicles and the 
Nay vehicle were sufficiently similar in design to make the recall 
notices relevant. 
D. OTHER COURTS HAVE RULED THAT RECALL NOTICES ARE ADMISSIBLE TO 
ESTABLISH THAT A DESIGN IS DEFECTIVE. 
Other courts have ruled that recall notices are 
admissible to establish that a particular design is defective. The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine so held in Maietta v. International 
Harvester Co. , 496 A.2d 286 (Me. 1985). In Maietta, the plaintiff 
sought to introduce evidence of a prior school bus recall to 
establish that the dump truck in which he was injured had a design 
defect. The Maine high court ruled that "[t]he school bus recall 
would tend to demonstrate that false cycling was possible and that 
it could cause a crash despite the abort mechanism. We find no 
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error in the trial court's ruling." Id. at 295. Just as the recall 
in Maietta was relevant to establish that false cycling was 
possible, the recall notices issued by General Motors are relevant 
to establish that stone interference was possible and could have 
caused the accident. 
The Ninth Circuit has also ruled that recall notices are 
relevant evidence that a particular design is defective. In 
Lonanecker v. General Motors Corp. , 594 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979), 
the Court held that the recall "letter was relevant evidence that 
there was a flaw in the mounts, and the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in receiving the letters." Id. at 1286. See 
also Fields v. Volkswagen of America, 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976) ; 
Gauche v. Ford Motor Co. , 226 So.2d 198 (La. 1969); General Motors 
Co. v. Van Marter, 447 So.2d 1291 (Ala. 1984). 
The Texas Court of Appeals recently decided a case 
similar to the present case. Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill, 714 S.W.2d 
329 (Tex.App. 1986). In Durrill, the plaintiff was injured while 
riding in a Ford Mustang II. Durrill sought to introduce evidence 
of an earlier recall of the Ford Pinto due to the same defect 
plaintiff claimed caused the accident involving the Mustang. Even 
though the recall was for a different model and occurred during an 
earlier model year, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the recall 
evidence was admissible to establish not only that the design of 
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the Mustang was defective in the same manner as the Pinto, but also 
to bolster plaintiff's claim that Ford failed to warn plaintiff of 
the danger in the Mustang. Id. at 340. See generally Annotation, 
"Products Liability: Admissability, Against Manufacturer, of 
Product Recall Letter." 84 A.L.R.3d 1220 (1978). 
E. THE RECALL NOTICES ARE RELEVANT TO ESTABLISH THE CREDIBILITY OP 
THE EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY INTRODUCED BY BOTH PARTIES. 
The recall notices are also relevant for the jury to 
establish the credibility of the expert witness testimony presented 
by both parties. The appellants' expert witnesses have vigorously 
advanced the stone interference theory as a defect and also as the 
cause of the accident. General Motors1 expert witnesses have 
characterized the appellants' theory as "nonsense" and 
"impossible". Yet the recall notices issued by General Motors in 
1973 would establish that there is a possibility that a stone could 
become lodged within the steering coupling, i.e. between the 
flexible coupling (moveable part) and the end retainer nut (non-
moveable part). 
On the basis of these recall notices, the jury could have 
concluded that stone interference is a valid theory and thereby 
discounted General Motors' expert witness testimony to the 
contrary. If the recall notices established that stone 
interference was a possible cause of the accident, the jury might 
have dismissed as unreliable other testimony of General Motors' 
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expert witnesses. That the recall notices were issued by General 
Motors would have been particularly relevant to the credibility of 
General Motors1 expert witnesses, since these experts now contend 
that stone interference is not a viable theory when the recall 
notice was issued for that precise danger. 
Also, the jury could have used the recall notices as 
relevant evidence that appellants' theory was credible, and thereby 
bolstered the appellants' expert witness testimony. Without the 
recall notices, the jury was forced to weigh only the conflicting 
testimony of the expert witnesses. Admission of the recall notices 
would have lent further credence to the appellants version of the 
accident. 
The recall notices are therefore relevant not only to 
discredit the expert witnesses presented by General Motors, but 
also to bolster appellant's expert witness testimony regarding the 
defect in the vehicle. 
F. THE RECALL NOTICES ARE RELEVANT TO ESTABLISH KNOWLEDGE ON THE 
PART OF GENERAL MOTORS, THEREBY SUPPORTING APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The 1973 recall notices issued by General Motors are also 
relevant to support appellants1 claim for punitive damages. 
Typically, strict liability is a no-fault action, and therefore the 
manufacturer's conduct is irrelevant. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY, § 5.05[2] (1989). But where the plaintiff alleges 
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punitive damages, the focus shifts to the manufacturer's conduct• 
Id. Recall notices are "relevant evidence" of this conduct. The 
recall notices indicate that the manufacturer had knowledge that a 
particular design was defective and was unreasonably dangerous to 
users of the product. 
The Montana Supreme Court has held that recall notices 
would tend to prove malice and are therefore relevant to support a 
claim for punitive damages. Kuiper v. District Court, 632 P.2d 694 
(Mont. 1981). The California Court of Appeals has likewise found 
that recall notices are relevant to establish knowledge by the 
manufacturer that a particular design is defective, thereby 
supporting a claim for punitive damages. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor 
Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981). 
Here, the General Motors recall is relevant evidence that 
General Motors was aware that placing the flexible coupling in 
close proximity to a non-moving part would create a defect causing 
the steering to malfunction. By allowing the recall notices to be 
admitted into evidence, appellants could pursue their claim for 
punitive damages. 
The recall notices should have been admitted for these 
purposes. The notices were relevant evidence that the placing of 
the flexible steering coupling in close proximity to a non-moveable 
part, creating a pinch-point, constituted a defect. The notices 
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were also relevant to establish the credibility of the expert 
witnesses introduced by both parties. Also, the notices bolstered 
appellants1 contention that stone interference was a reasonable 
explanation as to the cause of the accident. Finally, the notices 
were probative evidence that General Motors was aware of the 
dangers of placing the flexible coupling in close proximity to a 
non-moving part. This awareness could support appellants1 claim 
for punitive damages. 
The recall notices should have been admissible at the 
trial of this matter. The appellants established that the design of 
the Nay vehicle was substantially similar to the design of the 
recalled vehicles, and was therefore relevant. The notices were 
relevant not only to establish that the design of the Nay vehicle 
was defective, but also to establish the credibility of the expert 
witness testimony offered by both parties. 
The Fifth Circuit, in Lowe, has already held that these 
recall notices were relevant in a case very similar to the subject 
matter. The Court in Lowe found that the potential of stone 
interference between the steering coupling and the frame was quite 
similar to the potential of stone interference inside the coupling, 
i.e. between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut. Lowe 
follows the majority of cases which hold that recall notices are 
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relevant in a products liability matter. 63 AmJur 2d Products 
Liability §259. 
REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION 
The appellants respectfully request that the directed 
verdict granted by the trial court to General Motors be reversed, 
and a new trial ordered. At this new trial, the appellants request 
that evidence of the 1973 recall (NHTSA 73-0013) of vehicles with 
designs similar to the Nay vehicle be admissible. 
DATED this /7 day of July, 1991. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
&4,hovJ J )7l^ 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Attorney for Plaintif 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the // day of July, 1991, I 
caused a true and correct copy of APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be hand 
delivered to H. James Clegg, SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, Attorney 
for Defendants/Respondents, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor. P.O. 
Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145. 
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C H E V R O L E T MOTOR DIVISION 
G«r*ral Motor* Corporation C«*rai om— Wmrwm Mmmtu 
30007 V#n Dy*.* Awm* 
(Certified Mail Notification Used by Chevrolet w«rr#n. M«*»g«n 4*»o 
Motor Division for All Owners of Record.) 
Dear Chevrolet Owner: 
Our records indicate that you are the owner of a 1971 or 1972 
Biscayne, Bel Air, Impala, Caprice or one of the following model 
station wagons: Brookwood, Townsman, Kingswood or Kingswood 
Estate. 
In accordance with the notification provisions of the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, we are sending this 
letter to urge you to have a steering coupling-shield installed 
on your Chevrolet to prevent the possibility of a partial loss of 
steering control should a stone lodge between the steering coupl-
ing and frame of your car. If you will take your car to any 
Chevrolet dealer, this protective shield will be installed at no 
charge to you. 
Such an incident could occur when you drive your car on an unpaved 
road surface if a stone should be thrown up into the engine compart-
ment where it can lodge between the steering coupling and the frame. 
If this should happen, it may cause increased steering effort or 
interference with steering control of your car. It is possible 
that it could even result in a partial loss of steering control. 
If, before you have this shield installed, you are required to 
drive on gravel roads, particularly those which are extremely wavy, 
rutted or filled with chuck holes, you should not drive at speeds 
which will cause your car to pitch excessively. You should reduce 
your speed so that the front frame crossmember will not contact 
the road surface and scoop up loose stones or gravel from the road-
way. 
Again, we urge you to contact any Chevrolet dealer and arrange for 
installation of this steering coupling shield. There will be no 
charge for the parts and labor involved. In the great majority of 
cases the actual work to install this shield will take less than 
15 minutes; however, prior to taking your car to a Chevrolet dealer, 
we suggest that you contact the dealer's service department and 
determine when parts and service time will be available. This will 
enable the dealer to complete the installation in the 3hortest 
possible time. 
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The enclosed Campaign Claim Porm, GSD-761, identifies your vehicle. 
Presentation of this form to your Chevrolet dealer will assist him 
in completing the necessary modification to your vehicle. 
We are sorry to cause you this inconvenience; however, we have taken 
this action in the interest of your safety and continued satisfaction 
with our products. 
Chevrolet Motor Division 
General Motors Corporation 
Enclosure 
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73-0013(fT) 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION ^ M H M M W h t 
f - PLAINTIFFS DEPOSITION ] 
1 j EXHIBIT I 
January 19, 1973 I - / 1 
Mr. A. G. Detrick, Acting Diractor 
Office of Defects Investigation 
Motor Vehicle Programs 
Rational Highway Traffic Safety Adm. 
U. S. Department of Transportation 
400 7th Street, S. V. 
Washington, D. C. 20590 
Dear Mr. Detrick: 
The following information is submitted in accordance with requirements of 
Federal Regulation 573.4 as it applies to a determination by General Motors 
of a defect involving certain 1971 & 1972 Chevroleta, Pontiaca, Oldamobiles, 
and Buicks. 
573.4(c)(1) Chevrolet Motor Division, Pontiac Motor Division, Oldsmobile 
Motor Division and Buick Motor Division of General Motors Corporation 
573.4(c)(2)(3) (4) See attached listing 
573.4(c)(5) When these cars are driven on unpaved road surfaces, parti-
cularly roada which are heavily graveled and which are extremely wavy, 
rutted or filled with chuck holes, at speeds which cause the car to pitch 
excessively, the front crossmembcr may scoop-up loose stones or gravel from 
the roadway. These stones may be thrown up into the engine compartment. 
The possibility exists that one of these stones may lodge between the steer-
ing coupling and the frame and cause increased steering effort or interference 
with steering control of the car when the steering wheel is turned to the 
left. 
573.4(c) (6) Early in 1972 General Motors began investigating reports of 
steering interference allegedly caused by stones becoming lodged in the area 
between the steering shaft coupling and frame on 1971 and 1972 full-sire 
General Motors cars. The NHTSA commenced its own investigation in which 
General Motors participated by furnishing information and engaging in tech-
nical discussions with NHTSA personnel. 
During its investigation, General Motors developed a protective shield to 
cover the steering shaft coupling. In view of the unusual road and driving 
circusMtances which were found to cause such interference, General Motors 
issued a dealer service bulletin to idvise its dealers of the availability 
of this shield, particularly to owners vho might encounter those circum-
stances. This shield was made available to owners on a no-charge basis. 
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C « w i Motor* B«Udlnt 9044 W H I Gfnd EUrclrvard Dot roU. Michigan 48202 
Mr. A. C D«trick 
January 1». 1»73 i J - L ' C ' I S ^ 
The KHTSA than iasuad a Consumer Protect ion Bul let in advis ing the public of 
the p o t e n t i a l problem and of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the p r o t e c t i v e sh ie ld* 
Both the NHTSA and General Motors continued their i n v e s t i g a t i o n s to determine 
i f add i t i ona l s t eps should be taken. General Motors has now decided that i t 
i s in the bast i n t e r e s t s of i t s customers to send a defect n o t i f i c a t i o n under 
Sect ion 113 of the National Traff ic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. 
5 7 3 . 4 ( c ) ( 7 ) I n s t a l l s h i e l d k i t 231460 on a l l affected v e h i c l e s , 
5 7 3 . 4 ( c ) ( 8 ) Copies of the dealer b u l l e t i n and owner l e t t e r w i l l be sent no 
l a t e r than at the time they are forwarded to dealers . A representa t ive copy 
of dealer n o t i f i c a t i o n i s a t tached. 
Very tru ly yours, Very tru ly yours, 
jy J. C. Bates 
Director, Service Section 
Attachments 
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§ 4:1.124 AUTOMOBILE DESIGN LIABILITY 2d 
NHTSA Date of 
Identification Company 
Number Notification Make Model 
Mode] 
Year 
Number 
of 
Vehicles 
72-0298 124-72 Pontiac Safaris and 197 
Grand Safaris 
Station Wagon 
144 
Brief Description of Defect 
Possibility that rear window defogger was incorrectly wired Wiring was wired directly 
to fuse block in such way that use of defogger concurrently with directional signals, 
back-up lights or rear power window could result in blowing 20 amp fuse iCorrect by 
inspecting and re-wirmg properly where necessarv J 
72-0303 12-6-72 Chevrolet 1973 693 
1973 
Chevelle and 
Camino 
GMC Sprint 
Brief Description of Defect 
Possibility that seat belt warning system may be rendered inoperative due to mismat-
mg of relay jumper wire assembly at parking brake alarm switch 'Correct by inspecting 
and installing jumper wire with terminal and connectors that mate properly J 
1973 3,083 72-0304 12-6-72 Chevrolet Camero 
Brief Description of Defect 
Possibility that parking braKe pawl was improperly heat-treated If condition exists, 
"soft" pawl causes pawl to bend or break, which would affect hold ability of parking 
brake (Correct by inspecting and replacing pawl where necessary ) 
72-0305 12-6-72 Chevrolet 
Pontiac 
Oldsmobile 
1973 
1973 
1973 
3,225 Nova 
Ventura 
Omega 
Brief Description of Defect 
Possibility that seat belt warning system will not function with vehicle in third gear 
due to rotation of shift tube not always making contact with seat belt warning system 
relay (Correct by inspecting and installing redesigned shift rod and new shift levers ) 
73-0013 0-19-73 Chevrolet 
Pontiac 
Oldsmobile 
Buick 
Biscayne 
Bel Air 
Impaia 
Caprice 
Catalma 
Bonneville 
Grandville 
88 and 98 
Lesabre 
Centurion 
Electra 
Riviera 
1971 
1972 
1971 
1972 
1971 
1972 
1971 
1972 
3,707,064 
Brief Description of Defect 
Possibility that while driving on unpaved road surfaces (particularly roads which are 
heavily graveled, extremely wavy or filled with chuck holes) at speeds which cause car to 
pitch excessively, front crossmember may scoop up loose stones or gravel and throw 
them into engine compartment One of these stones could lodge between steering 
coupling and frame and cause increased steering effort or interference with steering 
control of car when steering wheel is turned to left (Correct by inspecting and installing 
shield on affected vehicles ) 
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Roy Ronald LOWE, as Administrator of 
the Estate of Lou Ann Lowe, 
Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Roy FULFORD, as Administrator of the 
Estate of Elva Fulford, Deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Nos. 77-2737, 77-2738. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit. 
Aug. 29, 1980. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 9, 1980. 
Husbands of two women who were 
killed when the steering mechanism of the 
automobile in which they were travelling 
suddenly locked, causing the automobile to 
go out of control, brought suit under the 
Alabama wrongful death statute against 
the manufacturer of the automobile. The 
manufacturer removed the case to federal 
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 
After hearing the evidence, a jury rendered 
a verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of 
$500,000 each. The manufacturer then 
moved for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial and 
the District Court granted the motion for a 
new trial, reasoning that it had committed 
an error in its jury instruction. At the 
second trial, the jury returned a verdict for 
the manufacturer and judgment was en-
tered on the verdict by the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of 
Alabama, Frank H. McFadden, Chief 
Judge. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court 
of Appeals, Brown, Circuit Judge, held that: 
(1) in Alabama, a violation of the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act is 
evidence of negligence per se; (2) evidence 
that the manufacturer violated the MVSA 
by sending an inadequate recall notice 
which did not warn of the possibility of a 
total loss of steering control was relevant 
and admissible; (3) the evidence presented 
a jury question whether the manufacturer's 
recall campaign gave adequate warning of 
the dangerdto owners of the affected-auto-
mobiles ami-whether this was "Fgroxtmate 
cause of the~deaths of plaintiffs^feeedests 
(4) it waa-ftot unreasonable f o? l^re~ j wg~ft» 
conclude th&tpthe warning proS&ecf STIte 
manufacturer was inadequate and thus vio-
lated the MVSA; (5) the jury could reason-
ably have concluded that the manufactur-
er's violation of the MVSA was a proximate 
cause of the accident; and (6) the verdict at 
the first trial was reinstated and the case 
remanded with instructions to fix remitti-
turs appropriate under the governing law. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Automobiles <s=»16 
In products liability action brought un-
der the Alabama wrongful death statute 
which was removed to federal district court 
by the defendant automobile manufacturer, 
the district court's admission of evidence 
tending to show that the manufacturer had 
violated the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act did not amount to allow-
ing a diceefc-sause of action under the 
MVSA where the sole purpose of the evi-
dence was to show that the manufacturer 
was negligent per se. Code of Ala. 1975, 
§ 6-5-410*r~Hational Traffic and Motor Ve-
hicle SafefpAct of 1966, §§ 113, 151, 15 
U.S.C.A. §§TI402, 1411. 
2. Automobiles <s=>16 
Wher&daetion against automobile man-
ufacturer-waa-brought under the Alabama 
wrongful deatit statute and the only rela-
tionship thai-tlia-manufaeturer's alleged vi-
olation of J&e-N&tional Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle S^gJ^Act had to the lawsuit was 
as evidencezofrmairofacturer's negligence, 
such referencer-to the federal law to estab-
lish negligence did not metamorphose the 
plaintiffs' wrongful death claim into a pri-
vate cause of action under the MVSA. 
Code of Ala.1975, § 6-5-410; National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 
1966, §§ 1KF151, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 140271411. 
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3. Automobiles <£=*16 
In Alabama, evidence that a defendant 
has violated the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act is evidencerof negli-
gence per se. National Traf£Ic-and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,_§§ 113, 151, 15 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1402, 1411. 
4. Automobiles <§=*16 
In suit that was brought_under the 
Alabama wrongful death statuS^and there-
after removed to federal cour^%hether the 
defendant automobile manufacturer violat-
ed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act and whether that violation prox-
imately caused the death of plaintiffs' dece-
dents were questions of fact-£or- the jury. 
Code of Ala.1975, § £-5-410; National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 
1966, §§ 113, 151, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1402,1411. 
5. Negligence <s=>6 
If a statute creates a minimum stan-
dard of care, an unexcused violation, that is, 
an act done with less that minimum care, 
must be negligence. 
6. Automobiles <8=>16 
In products liability action which arose 
out of fatal automobile accident that oc-
curred when steering mechanism suddenly 
locked, causing the automobile to go out of 
control, evidence that the manufacturer vio-
lated the National Traffic and Motor vehi-
cle Safety Act in connection with its recall 
campaign was relevant and properly admis-
sible to establish negligence. Code of Ala. 
1975, § 6-5-410; National Traffic and Mo-
tor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, §§ 113, 151, 
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1402, 1411. 
7. Automobiles <s=>16 
In wrongful death actioit-against auto-
Bu>Bfe=flmnufacturer which^arose out of 
&&3€teftfe 4n which automobile steering 
mechaaismr unexpectedly lockedband caused 
the^automobile to go out of control, evi-
dence was sufficient to presents jury ques-
tion whether the manufacturers recall cam-
paign gave adequate warningr~to owners of 
affected automobiles of the danger present-
ed by a defect in the steering mechanism 
decedents. Code of Ala.1975, § 6-5-410; 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety 
Act of 1966, §§ 113, 151, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1402, 1411. 
8. Automobiles <§=>16 
Evidence that automobile manufactur-
er was aware that owners of certain of its 
automobiles faced risk of a partial loss of 
steering control due to a stone becoming 
lodged between a coupling and the frame 
was sufficient to warrant jury in conclud-
ing that the manufacturer might have 
known that there was a risk of a total loss 
of steering if a stone became lodged within 
the steering coupling and that, therefore, 
notice which the manufacturer sent to vehi-
cle owners warning them of "the possibility 
of a partial loss of steering control should a 
stone lodge between the steering coupling 
and the frame" and was not adequate to 
comply with the warning requirements of 
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act. National Traffic and Motbr 
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, § 113(a), 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1402(a). 
9. Automobiles <&=>16 
In view of evidence that automobile 
owner, after receiving recall notice warning 
of the possibility of a partial loss of steering 
control should a stone become lodged be-
tween the steering coupling and the frame, 
exercised more than reasonable diligence in 
attempting to procure a coupling shield for 
the automobile and to have shield installed 
by an authorized dealer, jury could reason-
ably have concluded that had warning been 
given of the extreme danger of a complete 
loss of steering, such owner would in all 
probability have been just as diligent and 
might have completely refrained from driv-
ing the car and, therefore, that the manu-
facturer's inadequate notice of the actual 
danger presented by the steering defect 
was a proximate cause of the deaths of the 
owner's wife and her daughter when the 
steering mechanism locked and the car 
went out of control and rolled over. Code 
of Ala.1975, § 6-5-410; National Traffic 
Cite as 624 ¥2d 1373 <1980) 
10. Death ^ 9 3 
Under the Alabama wrongful death 
statute, damages are not designed to com-
pensate the plaintiff for decedent's loss of 
life, suffering or pecuniary loss but are 
strictly punitive. Code of Ala. 1975, § 6-5-
410. 
11. Death <^95(1) 
The damages recoverable under the Al-
abama wrongful death statute depend on 
the quality of the wrongful act and the 
degree of culpability involved. Code of Ala. 
1975, § 6-5-410. 
12. Damages <s=>96 
Under Alabama law, the amount of 
damages to be awarded is largely within 
the discretion of the jury; however, this 
discretion is not absolute. 
13. New Trial <s=>76(l) 
Under Alabama law, the court may set 
aside or reduce a verdict which it believes is 
not merely overly generous but so excessive 
as to demonstrate bias, passion, prejudice, 
corruption or other improper motive or 
cause. 
14. Federal Courts <s=>415 
In removed products liability action 
that was brought under the Alabama 
wrongful death statute, the Alabama stan-
dard governed the substantive issue wheth-
er the verdict was excessive. Code of Ala. 
1975, § 6-5-410. 
15. Federal Civil Procedure <§=*2347 
A federal standard is applicable to re-
solve the procedural question whether a 
federal district court, sitting in diversity, 
should automatically grant a new trial on 
the basis of excessive damages. 
16. Federal Civil Procedure e=>2377 
The law in the Fifth Circuit is that if a 
judge finds that a jury verdict resulted 
from passion or prejudice, the proper reme-
dy is a new trial and not remittitur. 
17. Federal Civil Procedure s=>2377 
In proceeding to fix a remittitur, the 
district court must be guided by the princi-
ple that a plaintiff who has been awarded 
an excessive amount by one jury should 
have the option of taking the maximum 
amount that the jury could properly have 
awarded 3jr~of taking a new trial before 
another jury. 
18. Federal Courts <$=>543 
Any remittitur accepted by~me^5§&-
tiffs is not appealable. 
Edward F. Morgan, Tuscaloosa Ala., C. 0. 
Burkhalter, Gordo, Ala., for plaintiff-appel-
lant Lowe. 
Olin W. Zeanah, Wilbor J. Hust, Jr., Tus-
caloosa, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant Ful-
ford. 
Charles A. Stewart, Jr., Birmingham, 
Ala., Gen. Motors Corp., Detroit, Mich., Otis 
M. Smith, Eugene D. Martenson, Birming-
ham, Ala., for defendant-appellee. 
Appeals from the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Ala-
bama. 
Before BROWN, HILL and RANDALL, 
Circuit Judges. 
JOHN R^BROWN, Circuit Judge: 
This is r products liability action which 
arose out of an accident involving a 1971 
Chevrolet Impala in which the steering 
mechanism unexpectedly locked causing the 
automobile to go out of control. The result 
was the death of Mrs. Elva Fulford and her 
daughter, Mrs. Lou Ann Lowe. The hus-
bands of 4fee decedents brought this action 
against tfi^manufacturer, General Motors 
Corporatic3fF{GM), based upon the Alabama 
WrongfufeBs&th Statute, 1975 Ala.Code sec. 
6-5-410 (%merly 1958 Ala.Code, tit. 7, sec. 
123). The-pFaintiffs alleged that negligence 
per se waifgstablished by GM's violation of 
the National. Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
Safety AcCof 1966 (MVSA), 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1402 (m$y (current version at 15 U.S. 
C.A. § 1411 (West Supp. 1980)). 
[1] After hearing the evidence, a jury 
rendered it. verdict for the plaintiffs in the 
amounts s£ $500,000 each. The^ District 
Court, however, ordered a new trial, reason-
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ing that allowing evidence of any violation 
by GM of the MVSA to establish negligence 
per se was the equivalent of allowing a 
direct cause of action under the MVSA, 
contravening the holding oi~€ort v. Ash, 
422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, -45JLEd.2d 26 
(1975). 
The District Court held, in |fee alterna-
tive, that the verdicts were "excessive and 
demonstrated] prejudice, bias^aad passion," 
and that if this were the <HS^ issue the 
court would have required a ggw trial un-
less the plaintiffs agreed to aTemittitur of 
$250,000. The District Court was also of 
the opinion that even if a cause of action 
existed under the MVSA, there-was a fail-
ure to prove proximate cause between the 
violation of the Act and the accident 
At the second trial, no evidence of viola-
tion of the MVSA was admitted, and the 
jury rendered a verdict for the defendants. 
The plaintiffs now appeal and we vacate 
the order granting a new trial and the 
judgment in the second trial and remand 
for reinstatement of the first verdict.1 
J. The Facts 
In the early morning of September 17, 
1973, Mrs. Fulford drove to pick up her 
daughter, Mrs. Lowe, at the daughter's 
home in Gordo, Alabama, to bring her back 
to her own home in Tuscaloosa to spend a 
few days. In order to get to her daughter's 
house Mrs. Fulford, driving a 1971 Chevro-
let Impala, had to travel on a gravel road. 
At approximately 9:30 a. m., after pick-
ing up her daughter, the two were headed 
back to Mrs Fulford's house along a paved 
level highway, U.S. Highway 82. It was a 
dea£rjdryjfey Traveling atjabsut 50 miles 
-gez^^WZi _9iey overtook and- passed the 
-milx>moBM5perated by JohnJCalvin Davis. 
j[? dojscpMrs. Fulford went into the left 
fenB and then, after she had overtaken the 
car, t>ack Into the right lane, straightening 
her course. Davis testified th^t suddenly 
the Fulford automobile inexplicably angled 
to the left again, crossed the highway, trav-
eled along the shoulder of the road for a 
distance, and then overturned down an em-
bankment. 
A witness to the accident, J. C. Champi-
on, was told by Mrs. Fulford, as she lay 
injured in the automobile, that the car had 
suddenly become impossible to steer. Mrs. 
Fulford died in the ambulance on the way 
to the hospital. Mrs. Lowe died in the 
hospital a few days later. 
Chester Bambarger, the wrecker driver 
who towed the automobile away, examined 
it and determined that the steering was 
indeed locked. Upon a more careful exami-
nation of the undercarriage, he and an Ala-
bama State Trooper, C. W. Barrentine, 
found a stone lodged inside the steering 
coupling. 
II The Proceedings Below 
At trial the plaintiffs asserted two theo-
ries of negligence on the part of GM—first, 
defective design of the automobile and 
second, failure to adequately warn the pub-
lic of this defect. 
With respect to the first theory of negli-
gence, engineering expert for the plaintiffs, 
Dr. Sachs Hanagud, made an independent 
study of the vehicle and concluded that 
there were two related causes for the acci-
dent: (1) blocked steering due to the stone 
interference problem in the steering cou-
pling which resulted in (2) the fracture of a 
tooth of the Pitman shaft caused by metal 
fatigue and the stress applied to unjam the 
steering mechanism. It also was his opin-
ion that the uncovered design of the steer-
ing coupling was an unsafe engineering de-
sign because it allowed rocks to fly up into 
the bottom of the car and possibly lodge 
between the coupling and the frame, 
causing the steering to jam. 
Expert witness for the defense, Dr. Jul-
ian Doughty, was of the opinion that no 
stone interference problem caused this acci-
dent. Another expert witness for the de-
fense, Dr. Alfred D. Droulillard, was of the 
1. The procedure of reinstating a lurv verdict in Conwav v Chemical Leaman Tank Lines Inc 
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opinion that the tooth of the Pitman shaft 
fractured, not because of metal fatigue, but 
on impact at the time of the accident, possi-
bly, the defense asserts, when the vehicle 
may have hit a concrete abutment as it 
overturned. 
Fulford and Lowe also contended that 
GM failed to give the public proper warning 
of these defects upon their discovery, in 
violation of 15 U.S.C.A. § 1402(a), in effect 
at the time of the accident, which stated: 
Every manufacturer of motor vehicles 
or tires shall furnish notification of any 
defect in any motor vehicle or motor ve-
hicle equipment produced by such manu-
facturer which he determines, in good 
faith, relates to motor vehicle safety, to 
the purchaser (where known to the manu-
facturer) of such motor vehicle or motor 
vehicle equipment, within a reasonable 
time after such manufacturer has discov-
ered such defect. 
They claimed that GM violated this statute 
in three ways, in (i) the untimeliness of the 
notice, (ii) its inadequacy in describing the 
amount of danger the defect created, and 
(iii) GM's failure to provide enough steering 
coupling shields for all the automobiles sub-
ject to the recall campaign. 
First, the notice was not given within a 
reasonable time after the defect was discov-
ered. In 1971, GM learned that it was 
possible for a stone to become lodged be-
tween the steering coupling and the frame, 
resulting in partial loss of steering control. 
All Chevrolet dealers were mailed notice of 
this defect on May 19, 1972, but a recall 
campaign of all 1971 and 1972 Chevrolet 
automobiles equipped with power steering, 
with notice to individual owners, was not 
commenced until March 1973. 
Second, Fulford and Lowe alleged that 
the notice was inadequate. The letter sent 
to Chevrolet owners urged them to have a 
steering coupling shield installed by their 
dealers at no extra cost, "to prevent the 
possibility of a partial loss of steering con-
trol. ." The letter went on to say 
that 
[s]uch an incident could occur when you 
drive your car on an unpaved road sur-
face if a stone should be thrown up into 
the engine compartment where it can 
lodge between the steering coupling and 
the fraraeLTif this should happenv it may 
cause increased steering effort ofTnter-
ference with steering control S^ourca& 
It is possible that it could even resuSFm a 
partial lossrof steering control 
The notieenHd" not say that it was possible 
for a stone to become lodged inside the 
steering coupling, possibly resulting in a 
total loss of steering. 
Third, the notice was inadequate because 
GM did not make steering coupling shields 
available at their dealerships in numbers 
sufficient to implement the recall cam-
paign. As of October 27, 1973, GM had 
manufactured only 64,277 shields for the 
more than 3,700,000 1971 and 1972 models 
subject to the recall program. The morning 
after Mr. Fulford received the recall notice, 
he went to the Chevrolet dealer in Tusca-
loosa, but the dealer did not have any steer-
ing coupling shields. He went back once or 
twice more, but there were still no shields. 
Mr. Fulford also tried to get the shield from 
dealers in cities in Florida, Georgia, North 
Carolina and South Carolina, but no one 
had them- far all, Mr. Fulford went to no 
less than I3~different dealerships through-
out the south, and none of them had the 
shields. 
In its instructions to the jury in the first 
trial, the DIs&ict Court included the follow-
ing charge: 
The plaintiffs however further contend 
that the defendant was negligent in the 
handling: 'sf its recall campaign. Con-
gress has: passed what is known as the 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards Act. 
This actrn pertinent parts provide (sic) 
that every manufacturer of motor vehi-
cles shaTCnotify the purchaser of that 
vehicle of anjudefect which the manufac-
turer in good faith determines to exist if 
the defectrrefetes to motor vehicle safety. 
The manufacturer is required to do this 
within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers it. He is also required to give 
informatjaaito the purchaser about meth-
ods of C0£Fe&ting the defect. Motor .vehi-
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cle safety is defined as the-performance 
of motor vehicles in such a~manner that 
the public is protected agairisFTinreason-
able risk of accidents occurj^^as a re-
sult of the design, construction and per-
formance of the vehicle and S-ralso pro-
tected against unreasonabl£_^risks of 
death and injury in the event a t an acci-
dent. 
This act creates the duty on-the part of 
the manufacturer to notify the purchas-
ers of the existence of defects which a 
manufacturer determines in "good faith 
relate to vehicle safety and to detail the 
measures to be taken to repair it. This 
duty arises whether the defect results 
from negligence or not. 
Now, if the defendant fails-to exercise 
reasonable care in notification to the pub-
lic, including the owner of this vehicle 
and in directing ways to correct it, then 
there would be negligence m the part of 
the defendant. If you are reasonably 
satisfied from the evidence that the de-
fendant failed to use reasonable care in_ 
carrying out the notification responsibili-J 
ty of the statute then you should find 
that the defendant was negligent in this 
respect. If, however, you are not reason-
ably satisfied from the evidence that the 
defendant failed to use ordinary care in 
notifying the plaintiff Fulford of the de-
fect then you should find that the defend-
ant was not negligent. 
After the jury rendered a verdict of 
$500,000 for each of the plaintiffs, GM filed 
a motion for j.n.o.v. or in the alternative for 
^ M S m L The District Courfcdenied the 
Tfifftinrcfc j n.o.v. but grantedrthe motion 
fi^ra Mwjrial, reasoning that the forego-
S O k o X ^ r g e intimated that violation of 
tire MVSA~was negligence per se.and there-
2. In determining whether a private remedy is 
implicit in a statute not expressly providing 
one, several factors are relevant. First, is the 
plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial 
benefit the statute was enacted ' [citations 
by amounted to the allowance of a private 
right of action under the MVSA. Relying 
on the four guidelines set forth in Cort v. 
Ash, supra? the District Court concluded 
that there was no private remedy for negli-
gence under the MVSA. 
The Court went on the say that 
evidence of negligence in the recall 
campaign is admissible on the issue of a 
manufacturer's design and manufactur-
ing responsibilities including the duty to 
warn. Nevels v. Ford Motor Company, 
439 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1971); Larsen v. 
General Motors Corporation, 391 F.2d 495 
(8th Cir. 1968). The essence of the claim 
is negligence and failure to carry out the 
statutorily imposed duties is evidence of 
negligence. 
* * * * * * 
This is different however from saying 
that the Act created a separate right of 
action. Evidence of negligence in the 
recall campaign per se will not support a 
cause of action for damages. It is really 
an extension of the common law duty to 
warn, as plaintiffs' briefs suggest Ac-
cordingly, the Court is of the opinion that 
it was error to submit the issue to the 
jury on an independent theory of liability 
under the Act. 
At the second trial, however, the District 
Court disallowed the introduction of any 
evidence pertaining to reports and com-
plaints to GM dating back to January 1, 
1971, concerning the stone interference 
problem, GM's remedial action with regard 
to this problem, Fulford's unsuccessful at-
tempts to secure a steering coupling shield 
for his car, the recall campaign and corre-
spondence writh the Department of Trans-
portation, and Dr. Hanagud's testimony 
deriving purposes of the legislative scheme to 
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff5 [Cita-
tions omitted ] And finally, is the cause of 
action one traditionally relegated to state 
Cite as 624 F.2d 1373 (1980) 
concerning his opinion on the cause of the 
accident. The Court then granted GM's 
motion for a directed verdict on plaintiffs 
theory of failure to warn, or to timely 
warn, of the stone interference problem and 
its dangers. The jury rendered a verdict 
for GM. 
III. The Motor Vehicle Safety Act—A Pri-
vate Right Of Action Or Evidence Of 
Negligence Or Negligence Per Se? 
We conclude the District Court misinter-
preted or misapplied the Supreme Court 
decision in Cort v. Ash when it used that 
decision as the basis for granting defend-
ant's motion for a new trial. In Cort v. 
Ash, jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim 
was founded on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 as a 
claim arising under a Federal statute. The 
Federal statute under which the plaintiff 
alleged his claim arose was 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 610, a criminal statute which provided no 
civil remedy. The second count of the com-
plaint presented a state law claim, but this 
was independent of the claim under § 610. 
Jurisdiction over this state claim was pen-
dent to that of the Federal claim but was 
not based on § 610 directly. Thus, the very 
existence of the case in Federal Court de-
pended on the theory of a private right of 
action which, the plaintiff asserted, arose 
under § 610. 
The case before us today presents quite a 
different situation, procedurally and sub-
stantively. It was brought in Alabama 
State Court as an action based on the Ala-
bama Wrongful Death Statute. It was re-
moved to Federal Court because diversity 
jurisdiction existed. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 
(West 1966 and West Supp. 1980). Fulford 
and Lowe never asserted Federal jurisdic-
tion based on § 1331, arising under any 
Federal statute. Although the MVSA and 
its application might have significance or 
bearing on the case, the suit was not to 
enforce the MVSA, nor would an applica-
tion one way or the other necessarily have 
had decisive consequences. 
Fulford and Lowe made it quite clear 
that the only relationship the alleged viola-
tion of the MVSA had to this case was 
simply as evidence of GM's negligence. 
The concept that violation of a criminal or 
penal statute can be evidence of negligence 
in a civil action is not new to tort law. "[I]t 
is said tha£4he reasonable man would-obev 
the criminaHaw, and that one wtatdogs not 
is not acting as a reasonable BMH& ffirict 
therefore must be negligent/' W,.rProsseii 
Law of Teste. 191 (4th ed. 193] j&otnote 
omitted). 
"Motor vehicle safety" is defined in the 
MVSA as 
the performance of motor Vehicles or 
motor vehicle equipment in such a man-
ner that the public is protected against 
unreasonable risk of accidents occurring 
as a result of the design, construction or 
performance of motor vehicles and is also 
protected against unreasonable risk of 
death or injury to persons in the event 
accidents do occur, and includes nonoper-
ational safety of such vehicles. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1391(1) (1974) (emphasis add-
ed.) Thus* the Act creates a duty upon the 
automobile^ manufacturer to construct his 
product to be "reasonably" safe. Under 
§ 1402, it was also "reasonable" for the 
manufacturer promptly to notify the own-
ers of his product of any safety-related 
defect ancfetew-to remedy it. 
This Court has often held that violation 
of a Federal law or regulation can be evi-
dence of negligence, and even evidence of 
negligence^per^e. See, e. g., Reyes v. Van-
tage Steamship Company, Inc., 609 F.2d 
140, 143 (5th Cir. 1980) (Coast Guard regula-
tions); Manning v. M/V "Sea Road" 417 
F.2d 603,^0S (5th Cir. 1969) (Safety and 
Health Regulations for Longshoring). 
[2] Th£ mere fact that the law which 
evidences^aeglrgence is Federal while the 
negligence**action itself is brought under 
State cofrassn law does not mean that the 
state lawxlaijrijnetamorphoses into a pri-
vate rightEBLaction under Federal regula-
tory law. is Nevels v. Ford Motor Compa-
ny, 439 P a r 251 (5th Cir. 1971), a negli-
gence action under Georgia law, we held 
that violation of § 1402 "was relevant [evi-
dence] natnmly withrrespect to the statuto-
ry dutyr^rFord, but also in" regard to 
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plaintiffs contention of negligent assembly 
in the manufacturing process." Id. at 258. 
Once this evidence was submitted to sup-
port the plaintiffs assertion_&Lnegligence, 
the issue should go to the jury. Id. See 
Chrysler Corporation v. Department of 
Transportation, 472 F.2d 659JBQ n.13 (6th 
Cir. 1972); see also Todd v. United States, 
384 F.Supp. 1284, 1294 (HBB.Fla.1975); 
Florida Freight Terminals, InE. x Cabanas, 
354 So.2d 1222, 1225 (Fla.App3lK8) (Feder-
al Air Regulations evidenced negligence 
under Alabama law and Floridadaw respec-
tively). 
Nevels, supra, held that violation of the 
MVSA was evidence of negligence, but did 
not specifically hold that it was evidence of 
negligence per se. However, that case re-
lied on Georgia law to determine negli-
gence. "In this diversity action, we are 
bound by Georgia law with respect to the 
measure of care owed by the manufacturer 
to a third person." 439 F.2d at 255. 
Turning to Alabama law in the diversity 
case before us, we find that it states that 
violation of a statute is negligence per se if 
the following criteria are met: 
(1) The trial judge must determine as a 
matter of law that the statute was enact-
ed to protect a class of persons which 
includes the litigant seeking to assert the 
statute. 
* * * * * * 
(2) The trial judge must find the injury 
was of a type contemplated by the stat-
ute. 
* * * * * * 
(3) The party charged with negligent 
conduct must have violaterlliie statute. 
* * * * * * 
pjQRrejury must find the-statutory vio-
latfott^pximately caused theJnjury. 
Fox v. Bartholf, 374 So.2d 294^295-96 (Ala. 
1979) (citations omitted). 
3. The defendants contested the fact that the 
accident had caused Mrs Fulford's death, al-
though they admitted it had caused the death 
[3] We conclude that under Fox viola-
tion of the MVSA is evidence of negligence 
per se in Alabama. The purpose of the 
MVSA "is to reduce traffic accidents and 
deaths and injuries to persons resulting 
from traffic accidents," by "establishing] 
motor vehicle safety standards for motor 
vehicles " 15 U.S.C.A. § 1381. 
Thus, it is clear that Mrs. Fulford, as the 
driver, and Mrs. Lowre, as the passenger, of 
the automobile whose manufacturer was 
subject to the Act, were, as a matter of law, 
within the class of persons protected. And 
the trial judge so held in his order granting 
a new trial, even if it was with respect to 
the first criterion of Cort v. Ash. See note 
2, supra. The trial judge also stated that 
"[t]he Act was clearly designed to reduce 
traffic accidents and the resulting deaths 
and injuries." Therefore, the danger which 
caused their deaths3 was allegedly the type 
the Act guards against. 
[4] Whether the statute was violated 
and whether that violation proximately 
caused the injury were questions of fact for 
the jury. After the first trial, the District 
Court judge gave proper instructions to the 
jury on these two issues and in their gener-
al verdict the jury implicitly answered both 
questions in the affirmative. Thus, all four 
of the Fox criteria for finding negligence 
per se were satisfied. 
[5] We find another indication, within 
the Act itself, that its violation is evidence 
of negligence per se in a tort action. 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1391(2) states: 
"Motor vehicle safety standards" 
means a minimum standard for motor 
vehicle performance, or motor vehicle 
equipment performance, which is practi-
cable, which meets the need for motor 
vehicle safety and which provides objec-
tive criteria. 
To say that violation of a statute is negli-
gence per se is to say that "an unexcused 
violation is conclusive on the issue of negli-
at the first trial In awarding Mr Fulford a 
$500,000 verdict, the jury implicitly found that 
Mrs Fulford's death was indeed caused by the 
LOWE v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. 
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gence." Prosser, supra at 200. If the stat-
ute in question creates a minimum standard 
of care, as it does here, then an unexcused 
violation, an act done with less than mini-
mum care, would have to be negligence. 
[6] We conclude that the jury charges in 
the first trial on violation of the MVSA as 
evidence of negligence per se were correct, 
and that Cort v. Ash was not at all at issue 
in this case. Since evidence of GM's viola-
tion of the MVSA was relevant and proper-
ly admissible, the verdict of the second trial, 
in which no evidence of this violation was 
admitted, cannot stand. We believe the 
proper action to take is to reverse the order 
granting a new trial and remand to rein-
state the jury verdict of the first trial, at 
least as to the issue of negligence. 
IV. Causation 
Disposing of the Cort v. Ash issue, the 
principal ground on which the District 
Court relied in granting a new trial, we 
must face the first of the Court's other two 
comments concerning the jury verdict. 
These comments, appearing in the order 
granting a new trial, were dicta at the time. 
But on remand they must be addressed to 
determine whether the first verdict is to be 
reinstated in whole or in part. 
With respect to the theory of liability due 
to GM's negligence in conducting a recall 
campaign pursuant to the MVSA, the Dis-
trict Court commented that "even if a cause 
of action exists under the statute there was 
a failure of proof [of] proximate cause and 
on that issue defendant would be entitled to 
a directed verdict." 
We have already determined that no pri-
vate right of action was at issue in this 
case. Since this comment was made after 
the jury rendered its verdict, we assume the 
District Court meant that but for a new 
trial it would have granted a j.n.o.v. 
Our review of the comment on causation, 
therefore, will be under the same standard 
we would use if the District Court actually 
had granted a directed verdict or j.n.o.v. 
This standard, which applies in both Feder-
al law and diversity cases, is set forth in 
Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 
(5th Cir. 1969) (en banc): 
On motions for directed verdict and for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
the Court-Should consider all of the evi-
dence not-just that evidence whicfr-suj>-
ports the-non-mover's case b^"H! the 
light and-with all reasonable -stfeFeaeei 
most favorable to the party oggosea i& 
the motion. If the facts ancTinferences 
point so strongly and overwhelmingly in 
favor of one party that the Court believes 
that reasonable men could not arrive at a 
contrary verdict, granting of the motions 
is proper. On the other hand, if there is 
substantial evidence opposed to the mo-
tions, that is, evidence of such quality and 
weight that reasonable and fair-minded 
men in the exercise of impartial judg-
ment might reach different conclusions, 
the motions should be denied^ and the 
case submitted to the jury. A~mere scin-
tilla of evidence is insufficient to present 
a question for the jury. The motions for 
directed verdict and judgment n. o. v. 
should not be decided by which side has 
the better of the case, nor should they be 
granted only when there is a complete 
absence of-grobative facts to support a 
jury verdict. There must be a conflict in 
substantial evidence to create a jury 
question. However, it is the function of 
the jury as-the traditional finder of the 
facts, and nofHhe Court, to weigh con-
flicting evidence and inferences, and de-
termine the credibility of witnesses, 
(Footnote omitted.) Id at 374-75. 
[7] UnderJ&tis standard we believe that 
there was suffment evidence submitted for 
the trial court fal low the jury to deter-
mine whether-QM's recall campaign gave 
inadequate m&mxtg of the danger to 1971 
Chevrolet Impala owners and whether this 
was a proximate cause of the deaths of Mrs. 
Fulford and MEL Lowe. 
The notice sent out to Impala owners 
warned them of "the possibility of a partial 
loss of steering control should a stone lodge 
between the^g£@srtng coupling and"~the 
frame . . ^Emphasis added.jT^hisL 
accident invqgga wnomulete loss nf *Vn™*~r 
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ing control due to a stone lodged inside the 
steering coupling. 
[8] There is evidence 4o support GM's 
argument that they had never known a 
stone to lodge inside the sfeenng-coupling, 
and that in their experiments and tests, 
they had not been able even te-get a stone 
to lodge in the steering -couplmg unless 
placed there by hand. GM argues that this 
implies they could not possiM^-have known 
of this risk and therefore had no duty to 
warn of this particular danger. 
But making all the reasonable inferences 
in favor of the plaintiffs, we helieve that 
there was sufficient evidence injtheir favor 
to let the issue go to the jury. -The risk of 
partial loss of steering due to a stone lodged 
between the coupling and the frame and 
the risk of total loss of steering due to a 
stone lodged within the steering^ coupling 
are quite similar dangers. It is not unrea-
sonable to infer that if GM knew of one 
risk, they might have known of the other. 
Thus, the jury's conclusion that the warning 
was inadequate is not unreasonable. 
[9] Of course, a finding of negligence 
through violation of the statute is only the 
first step. There must also be evidence 
that this negligence caused the accident. 
This is where we disagree with the District 
Court. The recall campaign letter instruct-
ed Mr. Fulford to procure from, and have 
installed by an authorized dealer, a coupling 
shield for the automobile. As outlined ear-
lier, he exercised more than reasonable dili-
gence in his efforts to do so and to make his 
car as safe as possible. We determine that 
from this and all the other pertinent evi-
dence, the jury could reasonably have con-
clud$dbrUia&-had the Lowes beea~warned of 
fiicr-exfeeme danger of a complete loss of 
ateermgr-fchey would in all probability have 
4^ 33ie-Dis£nct Court states in its order that 
"{b]etween closing argument and charge, plain-
tiffs abandoned the theory of negligence in pro-
viding the means for correcting the defect " 
Whatever form the abandonmenttyf this theory 
took, we cannot know since it was done off the 
record The jury instructions did not mention 
this theory of negligence specifically In refer-
been just as diligent and completely re-
frained from driving the car.4 Considering 
all the relevant evidence, we do not believe 
there was a failure to establish the link of 
causation between noncompliance with the 
MVSA and the accident itself. 
V. Prejudice And Passion, Or 
Only Generosity? 
The District Court also commented on the 
size of the verdict awarded by the jury— 
$500,000 for each of the plaintiffs. The 
Court felt that these verdicts were "exces-
sive and demonstrate^] prejudice, bias and 
passion." The Court stated that, if this 
were the only ground on which to consider a 
new trial, he would have so ordered unless 
each plaintiff agreed to a remittitur of 
$250,000. 
[10-12] The damages awardable under 
the Alabama Wrongful Death Statute are 
strictly punitive. They are not designed to 
compensate the plaintiff for the decedent's 
loss of life, suffering, or pecuniary loss. 
Bonner v. Williams, 370 F.2d 301, 303 (5th 
Cir. 1966); Alabama Power Co. v. Irwin, 
260 Ala. 673, 72 So.2d 300 (1954). "The 
punishment by way of damages is intended 
not alone to punish the wrongdoer, but as a 
deterrent to others similarly minded." Lib-
erty National Life Insurance Co. v. Weldon, 
267 Ala. 171, 100 So.2d 696, 713 (1957). The 
damages recoverable under this act, there-
fore, depend upon the "quality of the 
wrongful act and the degree of culpability 
involved.,, Bonner, supra, 370 F.2d at 303; 
Irwin, supra, 72 So.2d at 304. 
[13] The amount of damages to be 
awarded is largely within the discretion of 
the jury. General Telephone Co. v. Cornish, 
291 Ala. 293, 280 So.2d 541 (1973); Airheart 
attempting to reinstate a theory of negligence 
abandoned by the plaintiffs Nevertheless, the 
evidence remained in the record and, as ex-
plained in the text above, is significant on the 
separate issue of causation 
We point out that the current version of the 
statute, 15 USC A §§ 1411, 1413, 1414 (West 
S u p p 1980) reOUires an an tnmnhi lp m s n n f a r -
Cite as 624 F 
v. Green, 267 Ala. 689, 104 So.2d 687 (1958). 
However, this discretion is not absolute. 
Airheart, supra, 104 So.2d at 687; Weldon, 
supra, 100 So.2d at 713. Under Alabama 
law, the Court may set aside or reduce a 
verdict which it believes is not merely over-
ly generous but so excessive that it demon-
strates "bias, passion, prejudice, corruption 
or other improper motive or cause." Air-
heart, supra, 104 So.2d at 690. 
[14,15] While the state standard above 
would apply to the substantive issue of 
whether the verdict in this case was exces-
sive, a Federal standard applies to deter-
mine the slightly different procedural ques-
tion of whether a Federal District Court, 
sitting in diversity, should automatically 
grant a new trial on the basis of excessive 
damages. Galard v. Johnson, 504 F.2d 1198, 
1200, n.l (7th Cir. 1974); 11 Wright & Mil-
ler § 2802 (1973). And always lurking is 
the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a 
jury trial. See Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson 
Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 
1970), modified, 456 F.2d 180, cert denied, 
407 U.S. 921, 92 S.Ct. 2463, 32 L.Ed.2d 807 
(1972). 
[16] Technically, the law in the Fifth 
Circuit is that if a Judge finds a jury ver-
dict to result from passion or prejudice, the 
proper remedy is a new trial, and not remit-
titur. Brabham v. State of Mississippi, 96 
F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1938); Glazer v. 
Glazer, 278 F.Supp. 476 (E.D.La.1968). 
In more recent years, however, District 
Courts in this Circuit have been less hesi-
tant to remit vast jury verdicts which they 
felt to be "grossly excessive" or "more than 
the law would permit," provided liability 
was clearly established. Edward v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co,, 512 F.2d 276, 281-83 (5th 
Cir. 1975); Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson 
Chemical Corp., supra. District Courts 
have not hesitated to remit even punitive 
damages. Gilbert v. St Louis-San Francis-
co Railroad Co., 514 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (5th 
Cir. 1975); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 
351 F.2d 702, 718 (5th Cir. 1965). In these 
11373 (1980) 
cases the remittiturs reduced the verdicts 
by one-half, two-thirds or even more.5 
By suggesting that the verdicts in the 
case before ua could be cured by remittiturs 
of $250,000 each, we conclude thafcih^Ks-
trict Court did not really believe that & new 
trial on thirissue was absolutelyaiecessaE£ 
due to bias,-passion and prejudices 3fcW2&. 
instead, addressing the similar altlougli 35* 
tinct question of "just too much," that is, 
excessiveness. Cf. Gulf Coast Building and 
Construction Trade Council v. F. R. Hoar & 
Son, Inc., 370 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1967); 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 
(5th Cir. 1965), affirmed, 388 U.S. 130, 87 
S.Ct. 1975, 18 L Ed.2d 1094 (1967). There-
fore, we remand this case to the District 
Court with instructions to fix remittiturs 
appropriate under the governing law. 
[17,18] In determining the appropriate 
remittiturs, the District Court must heed 
the maximum recovery rule, the standard 
set forth in Glazer, supra and adopted by 
this Circuit in Gorsalitz, supra : 
In proceeding to fix the remittitur, 
then, the Court will be guided by the 
principle that the plaintiff who has been 
awarded an excessive amount by one jury 
should hspre t^he option of taking the max-
imum amount that the jury could proper-
ly have awarded or of taking a new trial 
before another one. In determining this, 
it appearspproper first to fix the amount 
that [the District] Court thinks a properly 
functioning jury would have awarded, 
and this may be merely another way of 
saying that the starting point is the 
amount of damages the Court itself 
thinks proger on the record under the 
mandate-of the Court of Appeals. After 
that, the asffiErimum recovery rule requires 
the Court to determine the maximum 
amount ~B£ deviation from that verdict 
that couldJbe-ailowed without requiring a 
new trial. 
Glazer, supra, at 482. Any remittitur ac-
cepted by the plaintiffs would not be ap-
pealable Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 
Inc, 429 U.S. 648, 97 S.Ct. 835, 51 L.Ed.2d 
5. Edwards— $900,000 reduced to $450,000 Curtis —$3351X8)00 reduced to $400,000. Gil-
Gorsalitz—$1,380,000 reduced to $690,633 ben —$225#0CFreduced to $60,000. 
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112 (1977); Krahn v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 559 
F 2d 308 (5th Cir. 1977). Of course, if the 
plaintiffs refuse to remit, the~District Court 
may order a new trial strictly-on the issue 
of damages. See Lehrman—X^ Gulf Oil 
Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 47 (5th~€S>, cert de-
nied, 409 U.S. 950, 93 S.Ct 687t 34 L.Ed.2d 
665 (1972). 
VI. Conclusion 
Thus, we vacate the District-Hurt's order 
granting a new trial and the~j**dgment of 
the second trial. We reinstate the verdict 
of the first trial as to liabilit^negligence, 
and proximate cause of some damages and 
the District Court shall enter a judgment in 
accordance with that verdict, with whatev-
er remittitur, if any, as it deems appropri-
ate under Gorsalitz. If plaint&fsulecline to 
make the remittitur, then the District Court 
may order a new trial solely on the issue of 
damages. 
VACATED and REMANDEDT 
( o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, a 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
United States of America, 
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant, 
v. 
FILTROL CORPORATION, a Delaware 
Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 78-3006. 
IMfced States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit. 
Aug. 29, 1980. 
In a diversity case, a city in Mississippi 
some adjacent property, allegedly because 
defendant business corporation had contam-
inated its property and the adjacent proper-
ty with acid having a corrosive effect upon 
ordinary sewer pipes. In the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of 
Mississippi at Jackson, William Harold Cox, 
J., an appeal was directed for the defendant 
at the close of the city's evidence. City 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sam D. 
Johnson, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) city 
was entitled to recover costs of protecting 
its interceptor sewer line if it could show 
that costs were incurred as direct result of 
escape of business corporation's acid into 
city's right-of-way, but city would have to 
show that costs incurred were reasonable, 
and corporation would have opportunity to 
show that city failed to mitigate its dam-
ages, and (2) if the business corporation's 
land became permanently contaminated 
with acid before city bought easement, city 
could not recover from corporation decrease 
in value of land caused by contamination, 
but city could nonetheless recover special 
damages which it suffered because of the 
contamination, particularly where no one 
knew of permanent contamination of sub-
surface soil at time city purchased the land 
and thus contamination could not have in-
fluenced price paid by city for its easement. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded. 
1. Indemnity <s=*8(2) 
Agreement whereby city agreed to in-
demnify and save harmless business corpo-
ration from any and all loss resulting from 
any damage "arising out of or resulting 
from or in any manner caused by the loca-
tion, construction, operation and mainte-
nance and presence" of sewer main upon 
and across such business corporation's ease-
ment applied to furnish indemnity for dam-
ages which city incurred because it had to 
locate sewer line in contaminated soil on 
corporation's easement, and same was true 
though business corporation when it drafted 
TabE 
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TT. wen,—it you want to relate now to the steering gear or 
the couplingr there*s no difference between the B car 
and the truck, they're the same. 
Q. Right. I think it's clear, but let's take it even more 
so. 
When you were doing your 
demonstration on the B cars then you were trying to 
attempt to demonstrate interference between the 
flexible coupling and the frame; is that right? 
A. That was one of the things I was demonstrating, 
attempting to demonstrate, yes, would demonstrate 
because you could demonstrate it by selecting rocks and 
hand placing them in there. 
Q. But dropping them didn't work? 
A. It's hard to do it dropping. 
MR. HANSEN: Okay. Do you have 
the document with you that he's reviewed that he's 
referred to the diagram of the accident scene? 
MR. CLEGG: Yes. 
(Off the record) 
MR. HANSEN: On the record. 
Q. (By Mr. Hansen, continuing:) Mr. Confer, I am just 
reviewing now the Nay accident scene diagram that has 
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